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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O,F THE STATE O,F UTAH

ELMER HUBER and ROY HUBER
Plaintiffs and Respondents: ~
vs.
DEEP CREEK IRRIGATION CO:Mp ANY, a corporation, OLLIE W.
JUSTICE, ORLAND COOK:, DAR- , Civil No. 8430
VALL COOK and BEN COOK,
Defendants and Appellants,
:MOSBY IRRIGATION COl\IP ANY,
Intervenor.

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree
entered by the District Court on the 19th of August,
1955. The judgment was entered by the Honorable William Stanley Dunford just a few hours before he died,
and was probably his last official act as Judge. Because
of that fact and because the Court Reporter who had
reported the trial of the case left the State of Utah prior
to the entry of judgment, it has taken somewhat longer
1
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to get the record together on appeal than would normally
have been required.
The action was originally commenced by the Plaintiffs against Defendants and Appellants on March 19,
1953, seeking to quite title to certain water rights
claimed by Plaintiffs "as represented by Certificate of
Appropriation No. 1477." Plaintiffs further sought an
injunction against the Defendants and each of them
"from using or interfering with the waters of Deep Creek
whenever the use of interference by these Defendants
would cause the flow thereof at the point of diversion
of these Plaintiffs to recede below 6.28 cubic feet of water
per second" (R. 2). Defendants filed an Answer and
Counterclaim in which they denied that Plaintiffs were
the owners of the right to the use of 6.28 Cubic Feet of
water per second, admitted that Defendants have for
many years last past used the water in Deep Creek
and claimed that they have the right to such use. The
Defendant Ollie Justice clain1ed that he had the right
to use 1-5/7 second-feet of water as a paramount and
superior right to .any of the a1nounts which the Plaintiffs
claim (R. 3-5). The Defendants further requested the
Court to order a general adjudication of the rights to
the waters flowing in Deep Creek under and pursuant to
the provisions of Sec. 73-4-18 lT.C.A. 1953 (R. 4).
Several motions were heard by the Court prior to
the time of trial. The case was finally tried commencing
August 3, 1954, at Vernal, Utah. On the morning of the
trial Mosby Irrigation Company sought, and obtained,
leave to intervene in the action pursuant to the stipulation of counsel for all the parties. The Court allowed

2
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the Complaint in Intervention to be filed, but ruled that
no matter with respect to the allegations therein contained would be heard or determined in the trial. All
matters claimed therein were left for such decision as the
Court might make as to the issue on a general adjudication of the right to the waters flowing in Deep Creek
(Tr. 3-5).
Following the trial, and on November 6, 1954, the
Court rendered a Memorandum Decision finding generally in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants although also ordering a general adjudication.
Thereafter, on December 27, 1954, Plaintiffs filed a
Motion to Reopen in order to present further evidence to
the Court. This Motition was granted and a further hearing was held on April12, 1955, following which the Court
on August 19, 1955, rendered its Supplemental Memorandum Decision. In consequence of the Supplemental
Decision of the Court, the Plaintiffs submitted Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree
which, as stated .above, were signed on September 12th.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
The Court's original Memorandum Decision (R. 1528) brings out rather clearly one of the issues between
these parties, which necessitates this appeal. The Plaintiffs rely wholly upon a Certificate of Appropriation No.
1477, issued to Moroni Gerber of Springville, Utah
(Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest) by which the holder
thereof is entitled to the use of 6.28 c.f.s. of water from
Deep Creek, diverted through a he.adgate and canal
known as the "Gerber Ditch," from Aprill to November
3
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1 of each year for the purpose of irrigating 377 acres of
land described in the Certificate of Appropriation. This
Certificate is dated July 12, 1926, and shows the date of
appropriation to be January 10, 1908. Plaintiffs contend
that such Certificate is conclusive evidence of the right
to the use of the amount of water therein stated, with
the priority date of January 10, 1908. On the other
hand, Defendant Ollie Justice has pending before the
State Eengineer's Office an Application for Appropriation of 1-5/7 feet of water with the priority date of
September 30, 1922, and the Defendants Cook have a
Certificate of Appropriation with priority date of March
19, 1924, for 1 second-foot of water(Exhibit 2).
It is the contention of Appellants that because of
the failure of Moroni Gerber to submit proof of his
appropriation as required within the time provided by
Section 56, Chapter 67, Laws of Utah, 1919 (which statute
was in full force and effect at the time) he lost his priority date of January 10, 1908, and that his priority date
was postponed until the date when his proofs were submitted. Thus, even though Appellants' applications are
subsequent in time, they are entitled to have the benefit
of such postponement of priority on Gerber's Application, which would give them superior rights over the
Plaintiffs.
Another issue between the parties in this action,
which was apparently overlooked or ignored by the trial
Court in its Men1orandum Decision, is as to whether the
Plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest gave up so1ne
of their rights to the use of water contained in the
Certificate of Appropriation No. 1477 by reason of
4
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,abandonment, nonuse, adverse use by Appellants, or by
specific agreement between the parties.
A third and final point in connection with this appeal
relates to the failure of the Court to make any finding
as to the fact that the right of the Plaintiffs under Certificate No. 1477 is "supplementary to Application No.
644 for a total of 196.51 acres of the total of 377 acres
to be served and limits the holder to a maximum of 3 acre
feet of water per acre of land irrigated per annum."
The Court in its l\1emorandum Descision noted that all
water "in excess of these limitations belongs to other
appropriators, or is public water." Notwithstanding such
notation in the l\1emorandum Decision, the Court failed
to make any finding of fact in respect to this point. It
is Appellants' claim also that there is insufficient
evidence in this case to show that Respondents are not
exceeding the maximum of 3 acre feet of w.a ter per acre
of land irrigated; and, therefore, there has been a failure
to show that they are entitled to the use of the water.

Appellants' points, which will be argued in order,
are as follows:
I

The Court erred in determining the priority date of the
Gerber Certificate 1477 to be January 10, 1908.

II
The Court erred in failing to find that the right to the use
of the water under Certificate No. 1477, has been limited by
reason of abandonment, nonuse, or adverse possession on the part
of Appellants, or by contract and agreement between the parties.
III
Respondents have failed to show the right to the use of any
water under Certificate No. 1477 because they have failed

to
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show that the land to which it is appurtenant does not already
carry the burden of water allocated, to-wit: 3 acre feet
of water per acre of land irrigated per annum.

ARGUMENT
I

THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE PRIORITY DATE OF THE GERBER CERTIFICATE 1477 TO BE
JANUARY 10, 1908.

The application of Moroni Gerber for appropriation
of 6.28 second-feet of water to be used from April 1 to
November 1 of each year, was filed in the Office of the
State Engineer on January 10, 1908, (Application No.
1713). Thereafter from time to time extensions were
granted for completing appropriation to and including
July 31, 1923. Although the record in the Office of the
State Engineer would indicate that some question might
be raised with respect to several of the extensions of time
given for completing appropriation, it is not the purpose
of Appellants here to do so. Appellants contend that
even though such e~tensions be conceded to be valid the
final proof of appropriation was not made within the
time required by law.
At the time Gerber was required finally to prove
up on his .alleged appropriation, Section 52, Chapter 67,
Laws of Utah, 1919, provided "the construction of the
works shall be diligently prosecuted to con1pletion and
the water applied to beneficial use, within the time fixed
by the State Engineer, not exceeding 1-! years from
the date of the approval of the application." The record
in the State Engineer's Office shows that Application
No. 1713 was approved by the State Engineer on July
6
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31, 1909. Thus, under the provisions of the above
statute, final proof would have to be submitted on or
before July 31, 1923, conceding that proper extensions
of time were granted. to the date. A letter from the
State Engineer to Moroni Gerber extended the tin1e for
filing final proof to July 31, 1909 with the statement
that "the law does not allow further extension beyond
July 31, 1923."

A purported written proof apparently without being
sworn to, was received in the Office of the State Engineer on July 30, 1923. However, no filing fees accompanied the papers nor did the written proof contain either
maps, profile or drawings as required by law. Thereafter, under date of September 4, 1923, the State Engineer wrote to Mr. B. 0. Colton, Jr. to the effect that
the written proof of appropriation relative to Application No. 1713 had been received but "both your written
proof and maps were due on July 31, 1923. In addition
to the fee of $1.00 for examining and filing proof, there
is a fee of $5.00 due for examining and filing maps, profile and drawings. Thirty days are allowed within which
to submit the required maps and fees to this office." The
record discloses that the fee of $1.00 was received on July
25, 1923 and that the fee of $5.00 was not received until
October 20, 1923, at which time Mr. Colton wrote to the
State Engineer to the effect that he was mailing, under
separate cover, profile and drawings. Section 55, Chapter 67, Laws of Utah, 1919 sets out the nature of the
statement to be made on completion of the work, and
provides:
"Said statement shall be sworn to by the

7
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applicant and by two disinterested witnesses, and
shall be accompanied by a map, profile and drawings made by a reputable civil engineer which
shall be made on tracing linen and shall show
fully and correctly the location with reference to
the United States land surveys; the nature and
extent of the completed works; the natural stream
or source from which and the place where the
water is diverted; the place and manner of connecting with other works or streams; the ground
and grade lines, the cross-sections and dimensions
of the various forms of the diverting channel; the
character of the materials moved and used in construction; the several appliances used to divert,
measure and regulate the water; the character of
all structures which cross, support or constitute
the diverting channel or any part of it, and such
other mater as will fully .and correctly delineate
the work done and conform to the general rules
and regulations of the State Engineer's Office.
The map, profile and drawings shall be certified
to under oath, by the engineer who has made the
same and by the applicant whose works the~~
represent, said certificates to be substantially of
such form as the State Engineer shall by general
rule prescribe. As soon as proof of completion of
the works has been accepted and approved, the
State Engineer shall endorse such acceptance and
approval upon the applicant's certificate of proof,
which shall then be a record of the cmnpletion of
the works to divert the water sought to be appropriated."
This section of the statute goes on to provide the
penalty for failing to make proof as required as follows:
"Proof n~ade subsequent to the date set for
the completion of the wor·ks shall cause the postponement of the priority from the date of tlze
original application to the date when the proof is

8
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made and all applications subsequent in time shall
have the benefit of such postponement of the priority; provided, that in case of works constructed
by the federal government, the official plans, maps
·and specifications approved by the proper officer
of the federal government shall be accepted as a
full compliance with the requirements of this Section, relating to maps, profiles .and drawings."
(Italics added.)
It is evident from the foregoing quotation that the
legislature considered the filing of the maps, plans and
profiles to be as important as the filing of the .affidavit
of completion of the works; that without the filing of
such maps, plans and profile the affidavit of completion
of the works would not be complete. That applicant
Moroni Gerber failed to comply with the provisions of the
above section of the statute is evident from the files of
the State Engineer's Office quoted above and from the
further fact that such files indic.ate that under date of
l\1:arch 5, 1924 the State Engineer had to return the proof
of appropriation for further correction. One of the defects noted by the State Engineer was that the application to appropriate was for 8 second-feet of water, while
the proof submitted was for 6.5. In that connection,
the applic.ant had assigned away more second-feet of
water than his proof was for; and, t4erefore, the State
Engineer commented the cer·tificate would have to be
issued to the assignees and not to the applicant or reassignments would have to be filed to clear up this matter.
Another defect was that there had been no me.asurement
of the water which must be given in the proof and shown
on the map, and that such would have to be done. It is
interesting to note that in answer to the above objection
9
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by the State Engineer, Mr. Gerber in a letter dated
March 25, 1924 (nearly a year after proof was required)
pointed out that the water had not been measured and
he would have to go out sometime later in the spring to
make the measurement before he could submit the final
proof of water filing No. 1713. Too, no blueprint of the
map had been submitted as required. Thereafter, three
further extensions of time were given by the State
Engineer to prove up on the water until on July 12, 1926
the State Engineer issued the Certificate of Appropriation, said Certificate being 1477 for 6.28 second-feet
of water to irrigate 196.51 supplemental acres and 180.49
primary acres of land.
Appellants contend that the provisions of Section
57, Chapter 67, Laws of Utah, 1919, which states that
priority of an appropriation "shall be determined by the
date of receiving the written application in the State
Engineer's office, except as provided in Sections 55 and
56 hereof" in effect determine that because of Gerber'R
failure to conform to said Sections 55 and 56 the priority
of his appropriation i s not, as against other appropriators on the stream, the date of approval of his written
application. Section 57 (insofar as it is here applicable)
appears now as Section 73-3-18, U.C.A. 1953, and Section
56 appears as Section 73-3-17, U.C.A. 1953. The fact
that former Section 56 required the State Engineer to set
forth the "date of appropriation" in the Certificate
does not make such date conclusive upon the parties
to this proceeding. Nor does the further provision that
such Certificate "shall be prilna facie evidence of the

10
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appropriator's right to the use of the water in the quantity, for the purpose and during the time mentioned
therein" justify the conclusion that the Certificate is
unimpeachable.
Other statutory prov1swns making certain documents "prima facie evidence" of the facts therein recited
have been held subject to attack by persons claiming
adversely to the person holding under such certificate.
Thus, a tax sale certificate which by statute has been
n1ade "prima facie evidence of the facts therein shown,
and the regularity of all proceedings connected with the
assessment, valuation, notice, equalization, levies, t.ax
notices, advancement and sale of property ·therein
described" may be attacked by a person claiming title as
ag.ainst a tax-title claimant. (See Section 59-10-36,
U.C.A. 1953). In fact, the legislative declaration that
the Certificate is "prima facie evidence" carries with it
the limitation that it is not "conclusive evidence" of such
facts.
In determining that Appellants could not go back
of the Certificate, the lower court relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Warren Irrigation
Company vs. Charlton, 58 Utah 113, 197 P. 1030, where
the determination was made under the facts of that
case "to follow the rules and principles which control
in cases involving the effect given to patents issued for
public land~" However, the court went to some length
to distinguish the matter before it from the facts in
New Era Irrigation Company vs. Warren Irrigation Co.,
48 Utah 544, 160 P. 1195. In the Charlton Case the contestant was a stranger in the matter and attempted to
11
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show a better right in a third person in order to defeat
the action, while in the New Era Irrigation Company
Case both parties were appropriators (as they are here)
seeking to establish a priority of right. The Court very
aptly stated in the Charlton Case in distinguishing the
New Era Irrigation Company Case that in the latter
"all the parties before the court were claiming under
alleged appropriations made under the laws of the state
relating to the appropriation of water. Appellants stand
in no such relation in the instant case."
We wish to point out that there is no public hearing
held on the proving up of an Application for Appropriation of w.ater; that no notice is published or given to
other parties as in the case of proving up a patent on
land under the Federal statutes. While the State Engineer is required to examine the ...1\.ffidavit of Proof, which
includes maps, profile and drawings, to make a determination as t o the .actual appropriation of the water to a
beneficial use and other compliance with statutory provisions, there is no discretionary act required in placing
the "prin1a facie" date of appropriation on the certificate
which he issues.
We respectfully submit that the trial court erred in
refusing to allow Appellants to establish by the records
and files in the State Engineer's Office that the priority
date of the Gerber Certificate 1477 was not as it would
otherwise appear to be the date of appropriation shown
on the Certificate.
See, also Chandler vs. Utah Copper Company, 43
Utah 479, 135 Pac. 106 ,where the court held that the
Certificate of Appropriation cannot prejudice prior

12
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rights that have been acquired. In Lake Shore Duck Club
vs. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 Pac. 309, the
court after commenting that the purpose of the law is
to endow .an appropriator of water with all the insignia
of private ownership, held:
"The certificate is his deed; his evidence of
title, good, at least against the state, for all it
purports to be, and good as against every one else
who cannot show a superior right." (Italics
added.)
Appellants seek in this case to show a superior right
because of the defects in Respondents' "deed." Both Respondents and Appellants Justice and Cook claim right
to use the water under permission from the State. If
this were a case involving title to lands where the claim·ants derive title from a common grantor, it would be possible to show that what purports to be a date of conveyance on one deed was not in truth and in fact the correct date, or that the recording date was not the true
recording date, even though another statute makes
entries in public records "prima facie evidence" of the
facts therein recited. (See, Section 78-25-3 and 78-25-4,
U.C.A. 1953.)
II

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE
RIGHT TO THE USE OF WATER UNDER CERTIFICATE
NO. 1477 HAS BEEN LIMITED BY REASON OF ABANDONMENT, NONUSE, OR ADVERSE POSSESSION ON THE
PART OF APPELLANTS OR BY REASON OF CONTRACT
AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

The aerial phontograph (Exhibit "A") as well as the
other exhibits and evidence of this case indicate that
Deep Creek is a long winding channel originating at
13
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some rather large springs several miles to the north and
west of the property occupied by the parties to this litigation. In the early season of the year the channel carries
a heavy run-off of waters from the Uintah Mountains
many miles away. However, as the early run-off water,
commonly known as the high water season, terminates,
the only source of water in the channel is that which
comes from the springs and what may percolate or seep
back into the creek bed from the lands on either side by
reason of irrigation or run-off water from floods or
storms. A good description of the location of the lands
of the respective parties to this litigation is found in a
report by a Mr. Burton, a representative of the State
Engineer's Office, who made a survey of the property
in June of 1940. Mr. Burton's report, introduced in evidence pursuant to stipulation of counsel for the respective parties, contains the following:
"On June 25, 1940, in company with 1\Ir. Justice, I made a field examination relative to this
Application. The Justice ranch is located 4 miles
north and 1 miles east of the town of Lapoint. The
ranch is a mile long and one-quarter miles wide
with the creek running near its east boundary
nearly the full length. Immediately upstream i~
the Parish ranch which has not been used to speak
of since 1934 or 1935; however, farther upstream
are two or three ranches that are fairly well irrigated. Downstream is the Cook ranch which is
being used by the Cook family, .and four or five
1niles downstream is the Gerber diversion. Attached is a sketch which may assist in conveying
an under~tanding of the Justice problen1.
"Mr. Justice has two points of diversion, the
first of which is approxilnately 100 yds. north of
14
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his north line and the second is downstream
approximately three-eighths of a mile. At the time
of my visit, Mr. Justice was diverting all of the
water reaching the first point of diversion, which
I estimated to be 0.10 sec. ft., and at the second diversion the small amount that is available which
it is necessary to store in the creek and upper part
of the ditch during the day and released at night,
with the result that one crop row is watered each
night. The creek channel, the bed of which is
sand and gravel, is dry from a point 150 ft. downstream from the second Justice diversion to a
point 150 ft. downstream from the second Justice
diversion to a point 150 ft. downstream from the
first Cook diversion, a distance of approximately
one-half mile. At the point mentioned below the
first Cook diversion, the water begins to develop
and increases most of the way to the second
Cook diversion. This development appears to
come largely from irrigation of the Justice field
as is evidenced by considerable sloughing of the
west bank of the creek and water seeping frorn
this sloughed earth. Much greater quantities a-s
a rule are available for diversion during the early
part of the irrigation season, a part of which is
stored in the subsoil and released more gradually
to the creek. At the time of this visit I found the
quantity of water at the Cook second diversion, so
near as I could estimate it, equal to the amount
being diverted by Mr. Justice at both of his diversions. I feel satisfied that if the Justice water
were turned down the creek with the conditions
as at present found, none of it would reach the
Cook diversions in direct flow through the creek.
Possibly a little would pass through the gravel
after sinking, but much would be lost in evaporation, etc. If Mr. Justice were forced to leave hi~
farm because of loss of this Application, there
would be no return flow from his lands, and it
15
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is doubtful under such circumstances if Mr.
Cook would have any water with drought conditions as they now are.
"The first appropriation from Deep Creek
was Application No. 1713 by Moroni Gerber, later
transferred to a Mr. Huber. Under this right the
water is used approximately 1 mile east and 1
mile south of Lapoint. During low water or
seasons of small runoff, the water will not reach
the Huber area. Many years ago a dispute arose
between the Huber right and the rights upstream,
and a meeting was held at which a verbal agreement was reached. This understanding provided
that if there were water enough to re.ach the
Huber ranch, none would be diverted by the upper
users until the flow at this ranch had reach 6
sec. ft. When the water recedes so that delivery
cannot be made to Huber, each owner of the upper
rights may take all that reaches his point of diversion, provided he does not exceed his right.
Mr. Justice said that this .agreement had been
honored by all until recent years when Cook began
to use water any time that it is at his points of
diversion."
It will be noted that this report refers to an agreement which the respective parties entered into several
years before the investigation made by l\Ir. Burton.
This agrement was testified to by the various parties
to the action. Mr. Roy Huber remembered that the agreement was made in about 1929 (Tr. 89), while others testified that it was in the late 20's or the first part of the
30's. Mr. Huber further testified that the agreen1ent
entered into with l\Ir. Justice and the others concerning
the use of the water in Deep Creek was in writing and
signed ( Tr. 107). As he recalled the .agreeinent. it was
to the effect that whenever the water would not reach
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the Hubers those above were entitled to use all the
water (Tr. 108).
The evidence further shows that whenever the
original appropriators up the stream took all of the
water out of Deep Creek (which they did when the high
water season was over), that a Mr. W. S. Perry, who
lived approximately two miles above Mr. Justice, would
place a tight dam in the stream so that the natural flow
of Deep Creek was shut off at that point. Thereupon,
those lower down the stream, including two persons living
between Mr. Perry and Mr. Justice would shut off the
w.ater by placing a tight dam across the stream.
Mr. Roy Huber testified that the only water which ran
in the Deep Creek channel below the W. S. Perry diversion after the primary appropriators had shut off the
stream was that which percolated back into the strean1
below the point at which Mr. Perry diverted the water;
that some water did develop below the point of Mr.
Perry's diversion (Tr. 90, 91); th.at approximately 34
of a 1nile below Mr. Perry a 1\fr. Eli Smith diverted the
water (Tr. 91). In being examined as to when the persons
below Mr. W. S. Perry would divert all of the water
in the stream, Mr. Huber testified that from 1929 (when
he occupied the Moroni Gerber property) he observed
that those persons down the stream would dam off the
Creek at their points of diversion and take all of the
water when Mr. W. S. Perry put a tight dam in the
stre.am (Tr. 82). Mr. Huber, however, testified that
when this was done that they would have to go up from
time to time and take the dam out. Upon being examined
as to when or any specific occasions that he might re-
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member going up and taking out the dam, he testified
that the only occasion he could remember was in May
of 1954; (Tr. 88) although he did recall that every year
after 1929 Mr. Justice and Mr. Cook would place a tight
dam across the creek during the month of May or June
( Tr. 95). He testified that no legal action was ever taken
to restrain or prohibit Mr. Justice or Mr. Cook fron1
putting a tight dam in the creek until1948; (Tr. 96) that
thereafter in 1951 the parties got together and signed an
application or petition to the State Engineer to have a
general adjudication of the water in Deep Creek; that
he was one of the parties who signed such petition and
Mr. Cook and Mr. Justice also signed it (Tr. 105). ~Ir.
Huber further testified that he knew Mr. Justice claimed
the right to use one .and one-seventh second-feet of water
and that Justice continued to grow crops on his land
year after year; that the only way he did it was that
when Mr. Perry shut off the creek up above that Mr.
Justice would shut it off down below (Tr. 85, 86); that he
knew when he moved onto his property in 1929 that ~Ir.
Justice and Mr. Cook were using the water above him;
that the first person using the water above ~ir. Huber
was the Defendant Cook, above him was ~Ir. Justice,
then Mr. Parish, then Mr. Eli Smith, and above him :Mr.
W. S. Perry (Tr. 80); that the W.S. Perry property is
now occupied by Mr. Don Simmons.
At the point of diversion where the Hubers take the
water out of Deep Creek there appears to be a pashal
flume, which was installed by a Mr. Leonard Horracks in
1951. Apparently no 1neasuring device was located at
the point of the Jiuber diversion prior to that tilne.
When ~ir. Horrocks put in the flume in June of 1951, he
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did not measure the water that was coming down the
creek at that time nor did he determine whether it was
being diverted by any users up the creek (Tr. 25).
Mr. Floyd Perry, a witness for the Plaintiff, testified that he was the son of W. S. Perry; that he now
occupies a place three miles upstream from the place
previously occupied by his father (Tr. 28). That in low
water he places a tight dam in the stream to dam off
all of the water in the creek; that his predecessors in
interest did the same thing as far back as 1908 (Tr. 20).
On cross-examination he testified that the users along
the creek all put in a tight dam at about the same time
each year, which is the time that the water goes down and
the high water ceases (Tr. 32); that when he was a boy
he remembered his father used to shut the water off in
the creek at his point of diversion, but that he didn't
remernber whether those below him did the same thing
although he imagined they did (Tr. 33).
Mr. John W. Gerber testified that he is the son of
Moroni Gerber and that he formerly lived on the Gerber
property, now occupied by the Hubers; that when W. S.
Perry took all the water out of the Deep Creek at the
end of the high water season other persons down the
creek would do likewise; that when the water was shut
off from the creek it would be known to the Gerbers
within an hour or two because the only water in the
channel would be that which would seep and percolate
back into the channel below the point of diversion by
W. S. Perry (Tr. 46).
~Ir.

Eli Smith testified as a witness for the Defendants to the effect that he was one of the users of water
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between the W. S. Perry place ,and the Justice place;
that when he moved onto the creek he made a filing for
water on Deep Creek, and it was his practice and custom
when Mr. W. S. Perry above took all the water that he
would do likewise ( Tr. 113). He likewise recalled the
agreement entered into between the parties to the
effect that when the water would not reach the Hubers
that the persons along the creek could put in a tight dam;
that that was when the water got down to approximately
a second-foot at the Huber point of diversion (Tr. 115).
This occurred about the same time W. S. Perry put in a
tight dam (Tr. 113). He further testified that the
Hubers never came up the creek and interferred with
the dams of the appropriators along the creek after
W. S. Perry took all the water at his point of diversion.
Mr. Orlando Cook, one of the Defendants, testified
that he w,as the son of Ben Cook who hon1steaded the
property now occupied by the Defendants Cook (Tr.
154); that his father moved onto the property in about
1922 at the time the Defendant was 12 or 13 years of
age. He testified that he recalled learning of an agreement which his father and others had entered into in
Vernal with respect to the use of the waters in Deep
Creek after the high water season ended (Tr. 164); and
that thereafter his father continued to diYert all of the
water out of Deep Creek and dammed the creek off con1pletely when Mr. Perry dammed it off above; .and that
he was never interferred with on the part of the Hubers
or others in that action (Tr. 165).
:Mr. Donald Siinmons testified that he now fanned
both the \V. S. PelT~· property and the Eli Sn1ith prop-
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erty (Tr. 266, 267). that since he occupied the Eli Smith
property in 1946 it has been his custom to make a tight
dam across the creek at the point of diversion for use
on this property .at the same time that he shuts off the
water at theW. S. Perry diversion point (Tr. 267); that
he puts in a tight dam "without regard to how much
water is in the stream" because there wouldn't be much
water there when it has receded so that the W. S. Perry
diversion shuts off the creek flow (Tr. 268).
~Ir.

Ollie Justice, one of the Defendants and Appellants, testified at some length concerning the practice
of placing tight dams .across the creek when the high
water ceased and the upper appropriators took all the
water out of the creek. He further testified that he had
over the years claimed the right to do so and that all
of the parties below the W. S. Perry diversion had made
it .a practice (Tr. 197). He testified about the conference in Vernal; that prior thereto he had discussions
with the Hubers and before them the Gerbers about the
use of the water but neither had ever taken out his
dams when he put them in the creek (Tr~ 212). At the
conference he claimed the right to use the water in Deep
Creek after the high water had ceased; that he had the
right to "use all the water .at Deep Creek at that time,
that came up below the Simmons' diversion" (Tr. 213);
that at this conference it was agreed that "after it was
shut off at the W. S. Perry place" he could have the
water ( Tr. 215). Thereafter Appellants followed that
practice until they beg.an having difficulty in 1948 when
the Mosby Irrigation Company turned water down the
creek and claimed appellants did not have the right to
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have a .tight dam (or any dam) in the creek during the
summer months (Tr. 216-224).
On cross-examination Mr. Justice reaffirmed his
testimony to the effect that when Mr. Perry dammed
the water off tight, the agreement was that the others
down the creek would do so likewise, "without regard
to how much water was in the stream" (Tr. 238).
On the basis of the foregoing evidence Appellant~
contend that the lower court should have found as a fact
that without regard to priority of appropriation, when
the high water season was over and the original appropriators up the stream took the entire flow from the
creek that appropriators below W. S. Perry diversion
and above the Huber diversion were entitled to do so.
Such a conclusion is justified on the basis of non-use
by the Hubers over the years, abandonment of any right
in the water after the high water season, adverse usage
by Appellants Justice and Cook, and by reason of the
agreement reached between the parties.
Section 73-1-4, U.C.A. 1953 provides that failure
to use water for a period of five years shall result in a
forfeiture of right. This is the same provision which was
in effect in 1919. (Section 6, Chapter 67, Laws of Utah
1919.) In Hamond vs. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P. 2d 894,
the court defined what constituted an abandonment and
held that it was not nece~sary to have an abandonment
to lose the right to the use of water under the statute:
"A forfeiture for nonuser during the statuma~· orenr despite a specific intent not
to surrender the right. It is based, not upon an
act done, or an intPnt had, but upon a failure to
u~e the right for tlw statutory ti1ne ..,

ton: ti1ne
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Likewise, the Hammond Case determined that a person might obtain a right to the use of water by adverse
possession. See, also, Spring Creek vs. Zollinger, 58
Utah 90, 197 P. 737; Wellsville-East Field Irrigation
Company vs. Lindsay Land and Livestock, 104 Utah 448,
137 p. 2d 634.
The court found that when the flow of water in
Deep Creek is so far depleted that it will not reach
plaintiffs' fields defendants should not be enjoined from
taking and using any of the waters." However, the court
failed to find when that would occur. It is a well established principle of law that when the water cannot be
placed to a beneficial use by a prior ·appropriator it may
be used by another whose rights is junior in time. See,
Albion-Idaho Land Co. vs. Naf Irrigation Company, 97
F. 2d 439; U.S. vs. Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 231 P. 434.
What the court should have done also was to find that
by custom, usage and practice-if not actually by agreement-appropriators below the W. S. Perry diversion
were entitled to the entire flow of Deep Creek when the
water ceased to flow past the Perry diversion. Certainly
Appellants had established their right so to do by their
open notorious and adverse use of the water in such manner, prior to the 1939 amendment which in effect forbade
acquisition of rights in such manner. See, Riordan vs.
Westwood, 115 Utah 216, 203 P. 2d 922.
III

RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW THE
RIGHT TO THE USE OF ANY WATER UNDER CERTIFICATE NO. 1477 BECAUSE THEY HAVE FAILED TO
SHOW THAT THE LAND TO WHICH IT IS APPURTENANT DOES NOT ALREADY CARRY THE BURDEN OF
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WATER ALLOCATED, TO-WIT: 3 ACRE FEET OF
WATER PER ACRE OF LAND IRRIGATED PER
ANNUM.
The certificate of appropriation under which Respondents claim the right to use the water (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit "D") reads in part as follows:
"Said water to be used as a supplementary
supply to Application No. 644 of the Whiterock~
Irrigation Co. for 10.63 acres in the SWl;(., SW1;4,
36.87 acres in the NWl;(., SWl;{.,, 29.4 acres in the
SWl;{., SWl;(., Sec. 14; 16.82 acres in the NE~,;l
NEl;(.,, 38.05 acres in the SEl;(., NEl;(.,, 40.00 acres
in the NEl;{., SEl;{.,, 24.74 acres in the SEl;J SE~i
Sec. 15, T. 5 S., R. 19 E., S.L.B. & l\L T total of
196.51 acres .find as a primary supply to irrigate
the 180.49 ac~es balance under this appropriation.
"This certificate does not entitled the holder
to use to exceed 3 acre feet of water per acre of
land irrigated per annum from all rights combined."
The trial Court decreed that Plaintiffs are the
owners of 277 j377ths of Certificate No. 1477, and thereby quieted in the Plaintiffs ''the prior right to the use of
4.61 c.f.s., of 6.28 c.f.s." The Court made no determination
as to which of the lands in question the water was appurtenant to or whether it was supplementary or primary.
Nor did the Court make any finding or determination
with respect to whether the land on which a portion of
the water covered by the certificate is supplen1entary
has already a sufficient and adequate supply for irrigation, to-wit: 3 acre feet of water per acre of land irrigated per annun1. This issue was not presented to the
lower Court because it did not appear at that ti1ne that
it would be involved in the case. However, the Court's
findings and decree are such that this 1natter now be-
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comes important. The Plaintiffs having been awarded
only a portion of the water covered by the certificate,
it becomes very important to ascertain whether such
water is supplementary or primary and with respect to
what land.
CONCLUSION
By way of summary, Appellants respectfully urge
that the Certificate of Appropriation is at most only
"prima facie evidence" of the right to the use of water,
including the date of priority; that in a dispute between
two appropriators of water the matters contained in
the Certificate may be challenged and evidence introduced to show that the same are not correct; that in the
instant matter the evidence proffered on the part of
the Defendants and Appellants conclusively shows that
the priority date of Certificate No. 1477 is subsequent to
the priority dates of Appellants Justice and Cook.
In any event, regardless of priority date, Appellant:5
are entitled to use the entire return and seepage flow
coming into Deep Creek after the high water season
and after the original appropriators upstream have
placed a tight dam in the creek. The matter should
further be referred back to the lower Court for the purpose of determining what portion of the water decreed
to Plaintiffs is primary or supplementary and determine
if the burden of use is properly carried.
Respectfully submitted,
NIELSEN & CONDER
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
Attorney for Appellants
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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